Informed Traders by Brody, Dorje C. et al.
ar
X
iv
:0
80
7.
12
53
v2
  [
q-
fin
.T
R]
  1
7 N
ov
 20
08
Informed Traders
By Dorje C. Brody1, Mark H. A. Davis1, Robyn L. Friedman1,2
and Lane P. Hughston1
1Department of Mathematics, Imperial College London, London SW7 2BZ, UK
2Royal Bank of Scotland, 135 Bishopsgate, London EC2M 3UR, UK
An asymmetric information model is introduced for the situation in which there is
a small agent who is more susceptible to the flow of information in the market than
the general market participant, and who tries to implement strategies based on the
additional information. In this model market participants have access to a stream
of noisy information concerning the future return of an asset, whereas the informed
trader has access to a further information source which is obscured by an additional
noise that may be correlated with the market noise. The informed trader uses
the extraneous information source to seek statistical arbitrage opportunities, while
at the same time accommodating the additional risk. The amount of information
available to the general market participant concerning the asset return is measured
by the mutual information of the asset price and the associated cash flow. The worth
of the additional information source is then measured in terms of the difference
of mutual information between the general market participant and the informed
trader. This difference is shown to be nonnegative when the signal-to-noise ratio
of the information flow is known in advance. Explicit trading strategies leading to
statistical arbitrage opportunities, taking advantage of the additional information,
are constructed, illustrating how excess information can be translated into profit.
Keywords: statistical arbitrage; asymmetric information; information-based
asset pricing; hedge funds; insider trading; mutual information
1. Introduction
There are many different approaches to the modelling of so-called insider trad-
ing strategies. Starting with the work of Kyle (1985) and Back (1992), a number
of investigations have been carried out (to name a few, Amendinger et al. 1998,
Seyhun 1988, Fo¨llmer et al. 1999, Back et al. 2000, Leo´n et al. 2003, Corcuera et
al. 2004, Biagini & Øksendal 2005, 2006, Ankirchner et al. 2006, Campi & C¸etin
2007). It is sometimes assumed in the literature that the ‘insider’ has direct access
to the values of future asset prices. While such a scenario may indeed occasionally
prevail, the more common situation is that informed agents do not have advance
access to the exact values of future asset prices. How, then, do agents having high
information susceptibility—when compared to the average market participant—
utilise their strengths in reality? An increasingly popular strategy adopted by some
large hedge funds is to make use of publicly available information in addition to
high-frequency price data. What gives these funds an edge is their significant com-
putational power for data and text mining, thus allowing them to extract useful
information from publicly available sources faster than their competitors. Against
this background it is natural to ask how much added information an extra source
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provides, how does it affect trading strategies, and more generally in what way can
such information-based strategies be modelled mathematically.
The purpose of the present paper is: (i) to introduce a phenomenological ap-
proach to model the agent susceptive to information, (ii) to quantify the amount
of added information, and (iii) to derive trading strategies that lead to statisti-
cal arbitrage opportunities for such an agent. Our analysis is carried out within
the information-based asset pricing framework of Brody, Hughston and Macrina
(Macrina 2006; Brody et al. 2007, 2008a,b; Rutkowski & Yu 2007; Hughston &
Macrina 2008). In this framework—hereafter referred to as the BHM framework—
the price process of an asset is derived from the specification of (a) future cash flows
associated with the asset, and (b) the flow of information accessible to market par-
ticipants. The price is then given by the discounted risk-adjusted expectation of the
cash flows conditional on the available information.
The simplest model that arises in the BHM framework is briefly reviewed in §2.
In this setup the asset is characterised by a contract that delivers a single random
cash flow at a predesignated time. Such an asset can be interpreted as having
the structure of a credit-risky discount bond. In §3 we consider the problem of
quantifying the amount of information contained in the bond price concerning the
value of the future bond payout. To this end we determine the mutual information
(Yaglom & Yaglom 1983, Cover & Thomas 1999) of these two random variables.
Initially the market has no information, beyond that already implicit in the asset
price, concerning the value of the cash flow. However, as time goes by, the market
gathers information. When the amount of information reaches the level of the initial
entropy of the cash flow, the market finally ‘learns’ what the value of the cash flow
is. The information-theoretic analysis is extended in §4 where we show that the
mutual information at time t is given by the initial uncertainty, less the expected
uncertainty that remains at that time.
In §5 a simple model for an informed trader is introduced. In our approach the
informed trader is more susceptive to the flow of market information than other
market participants, and thus on average is able to estimate the value of the im-
pending cash flow more quickly and accurately than the other market participants.
Simulation studies show a comparison of the sample paths for the market price
process and the corresponding valuations made by the informed trader, revealing
various intuitive as well as counterintuitive properties of these processes. The dy-
namics of the valuations estimated by the informed trader are worked out in §6,
where we obtain the associated innovations representation. With a basic model for
an informed trader at hand we are able to quantify the amount of added information
held by the trader. This is worked out in §7, where we construct an elementary trad-
ing strategy making use of the additional information, demonstrating the existence
of statistical arbitrage opportunities in such circumstances.
2. Information and asset pricing
The simplest model arising in the BHM framework can be summarised thus. We fix
a probability space (Ω,F ,Q), where Q denotes the risk-neutral measure. We write
E for expectation with respect to Q. The market is not assumed complete, but we
assume the absence of arbitrage and the existence of an established pricing kernel—
these assumptions ensure the existence of a preferred pricing measure (cf. Cochrane
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2005). We let XT denote the random cash flow associated with the asset and paid
at time T (for example, the payout of a credit-risky discount bond). Before time
T market participants do not have direct access to the value of the cash flow. We
assume nevertheless that partial information concerning the value of XT , obscured
by the market noise, can be obtained before time T . This noisy ‘observation’ of
XT generates the market filtration {Ft}, and the price at time t is given by the
risk-neutral expectation of the discounted cash flow, conditional on Ft.
We assume that the ‘signal’ of the noisy observation concerning XT is revealed
to the market at a constant rate σ, that the ‘noise’ is generated by an independent
Brownian bridge process {βtT }, and that the market filtration is generated by an
information process {ξt} defined for 0 ≤ t ≤ T by
ξt = σtXT + βtT . (2.1)
In other words, {Ft} = σ({ξs}0≤s≤t). The use of a bridge process for the noise
is motivated by the idea that at time 0 all the available information about XT is
incorporated into the a priori distribution, and that at time T the value of XT is
revealed and there is no remaining noise: the choice of a Brownian bridge is made
for simplicity and tractability. If we further assume that the default-free system of
interest rates is deterministic and let {PtT } denote the price at time t of a discount
bond that matures at T , then the price of the credit-risky discount bond at time
t is given by BtT = PtTE[XT |Ft]. In the case where XT takes the discrete values
{xi}i=1,...,n with the a priori probabilities {pi}i=1,...,n, a calculation shows that
BtT = PtT
∑n
i=1 pixi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxiξt −
1
2σ
2x2i t
)]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxiξt −
1
2σ
2x2i t
)] . (2.2)
This follows from the fact that the conditional risk-neutral probability defined by
πit = Q(XT = xi|Ft) takes the form
πit =
pi exp
[
T
T−t (σxiξt −
1
2σ
2x2i t)
]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
T−t (σxiξt −
1
2σ
2x2i t)
] . (2.3)
By taking the stochastic differential of (2.2) one finds that the dynamical equation
satisfied by the bond price is
dBtT = rtBtT dt+
σT
T − t
PtTVtT dWt, (2.4)
where rt = −∂ lnP0t/∂t, and where the process {Wt} defined by the expression
Wt = ξt +
∫ t
0
1
T − s
ξs ds− σT
∫ t
0
1
T − s
Xˆs ds (2.5)
turns out to be a standard {Ft}-Brownian motion. Here Xˆt =
∑n
i=1 xiπit denotes
the conditional expectation of the cash flow XT , and
VtT =
n∑
i=1
(
xi − Xˆt
)2
πit (2.6)
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is the conditional variance of XT (see Macrina 2006 and Brody et al. 2007 for
derivations of the foregoing results).
We observe that in the information-based framework it is possible to deduce
the diffusive dynamics (2.4) for the price process, starting from the specification of
the cash flow XT and the information process {ξt}. The theme that underlies this
framework is that the market acts as a ‘signal processor’ for future cash flows so
as to generate the dynamics of asset prices. This point of view is natural as a basis
for understanding the elements of price formation, since investment decisions are
often made in accordance with the perceptions of market participants concerning
the future cash flows associated with the given asset.
As far as the market filtration is concerned, the information contained in {ξt} is
equivalent to that in {BtT }: we have σ({ξs}0≤s≤t) = σ({BsT }0≤s≤t). This follows
from the fact that one can write BtT = B(t, ξt), where
B(t, x) = PtT
∑n
i=1 pixi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxix−
1
2σ
2x2i t
)]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxix−
1
2σ
2x2i t
)] , (2.7)
from which by differentiation we deduce that
B′(t, x) =
σTPtT
T − t
∑n
i=1 pi [xi −B(t, x)/PtT ]
2
exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxix−
1
2σ
2x2i t
)]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σxix−
1
2σ
2x2i t
)] , (2.8)
which is positive. Therefore, B(t, x) is monotonically increasing in x, and hence
invertible. It follows that from knowledge of the trajectory {ξs}0≤s≤t one can con-
struct {BsT }0≤s≤t; conversely from knowledge of the trajectory {BsT }0≤s≤t one
can construct {ξs}0≤s≤t.
3. Amount of information about the future cash flow
contained in the price process
We would like to quantify how much information regarding the value of the cash flow
XT is contained in the value at time t of the information process (2.1). A reason-
able measure for such quantification is given by the mutual information J(ξt, XT )
between the two random variables (Shannon & Weaver 1949; Gel’fand et al. 1956;
Gel’fand & Yaglom 1957), which in the present context is given by the expression
J(ξt, XT ) =
n∑
i=1
∫ ∞
−∞
ρ
ξX
(x, i) ln
(
ρ
ξX
(x, i)
ρ
ξ
(x)ρ
X
(i)
)
dx, (3.1)
where
ρ
ξX
(x, i) =
d
dx
Q
[
(ξt < x) ∩ (XT = xi)
]
(3.2)
is the joint density function of the random variables (ξt, XT ), and ρξ(x) and ρX (i)
are the respective marginal probabilities. By use of the relation
Q
[
(ξt < x) ∩ (XT = xi)
]
= Q(ξt < x|XT = xi)Q(XT = xi) (3.3)
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we deduce that
ρ
ξX
(x, i) = pi
1√
2πt(T − t)/T
exp
(
− 12
(x− σxit)
2
t(T − t)/T
)
, (3.4)
since conditional on XT = xi the random variable ξt is normally distributed with
mean σxit and variance t(T − t)/T . From (3.4) the marginal densities
ρ
ξ
(x) =
n∑
i=1
ρ
ξX
(x, i) and ρ
X
(i) =
∫ ∞
−∞
ρ
ξX
(x, i)dx (3.5)
can be deduced at once. In particular, we have ρ
X
(i) = pi, as it should be.
An alternative way of deriving the mutual information in this context is to make
use of the identity
J(ξt, XT ) = H(ξt)−H(ξt|XT ). (3.6)
Here H(ξt) = −E[ln ρξ(ξt)] is the entropy of the random variable ξt (Wiener 1948,
Khintchine 1953), and H(ξt|XT ) = −E[ln ρξ(ξt|XT )] is the entropy of ξt conditional
on XT . The conditional density function ρξ(x|XT ), x ∈ R, is defined by ρξ(x|XT ) =
dQ(ξt < x|XT )/dx. Since conditional on XT the random variables ξt and βtT are
both normally distributed, with the same variance t(T−t)/T , and since the entropy
of a normally distributed random variable is independent of its mean, we find that
H(ξt|XT ) = H(βtT ). In other words, the mutual information in the present context
is given by the difference of the two entropies:
J(ξt, XT ) = H(ξt)−H(βtT ). (3.7)
As a consequence, the information about the cash flow XT contained in ξt can be
determined (a different approach to extracting information concerning the asymp-
totic dividend stream from option price data is considered in Geman et al. 2007).
From an information-theoretic point of view a pair of processes related through
an invertible smooth function, and thus sharing the same filtration, in general
possess different information content (entropy). On the other hand, since what is
directly observed in the market is the price BtT , which is an invertible function of
ξt, one might argue that it is more relevant to determine the mutual information
J(BtT , XT ), that is, the amount of information about the future cash flow contained
in the market price. However, since mutual information is given by a difference
of entropies, and since changes in the two entropies resulting from the transform
cancel, we have J(BtT , XT ) = J(ξt, XT ). Therefore, the amount of information
about XT contained in BtT is given by (3.7).
In Figure 1 we plot the mutual information J(BtT , XT ) as a function of t ∈ [0, T ]
for three values of the information flow-rate parameter σ. The information gained
by market participants increases more rapidly as σ is raised. On the other hand, the
dynamical relation (2.4) shows that the value of σ determines the overall magnitude
of the price volatility. Thus it is possible to quantify the market information gain
and compare this with the price volatility.
To see how entropy transforms under a nonlinear invertible map, suppose that
X is a random variable with density p(x), and that Y is another random vari-
able given by Y = f(X), where f(x) is smooth and invertible. Then the den-
sity function for Y is given by q(y) = p(f−1(y))/f ′(f−1(y)). Substituting this in
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Figure 1. Mutual information J concerning the value of the future cash flow XT contained
in the price BtT . Early observation of the price yields little information concerning the
value of XT . As time progresses the market extracts more information about XT ; eventu-
ally, close to maturity when the value of XT is to be revealed the amount of information
gained by the market reaches −
P
i
pi ln pi. The parameters are chosen to be h1 = 0,
h2 = 0.5, h3 = 1, p1 = 0.1, p2 = 0.15, p3 = 0.75, and T = 5. The three plots correspond
to σ = 0.75 (blue), σ = 0.5 (green), and σ = 0.25 (red). The terminal value of J in these
examples is given approximately by 0.73.
H(Y ) = −
∫
q(y) ln q(y)dy and changing variables by setting y = f(x), we find that
H(Y ) = H(X) +
∫
p(x) ln f ′(x)dx. As a consequence, we have
H(BtT ) = H(ξt) +
∫ ∞
−∞
ρξ(x) lnB
′(t, x) dx, (3.8)
where B′(t, x) = ∂B(t, x)/∂x. The advantage of this expression is that we need not
determine the inverse of the function B(t, x) defined in (2.7) in order to calculate
H(BtT ). From (2.8) it follows that∫ ∞
−∞
ρξ(x) lnB
′(t, x) dx = E
[
ln
(
σT
T − t
PtTVtT
)]
. (3.9)
In other words, the difference betweenH(BtT) andH(ξt) is the average log-volatility
of the price process at time t.
4. Analysis of information measures
We proceed in this section to consider the Shannon-Wiener entropy associated with
the conditional risk-neutral probabilities. Analysis of the entropy leads to insights
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into the qualitative behaviour of the asset price volatility. The Shannon-Wiener
entropy is defined by the expression
Ht = −
n∑
i=1
πit lnπit. (4.1)
We shall demonstrate that the mutual information (3.1) and the Shannon-Wiener
entropy (4.1) are related as follows:
J(ξt, XT ) = H0 − E[Ht]. (4.2)
Thus, the mutual information at time t is given by the initial uncertainty, less the
expected uncertainty that still remains at that time.
The derivation of (4.2) proceeds in two steps. First we shall show that
E[Ht] = H0 −
1
2 E
[∫ t
0
σ2T 2
(T − s)2
VsT ds
]
, (4.3)
and then we shall show that
J(ξt, XT ) =
1
2E
[∫ t
0
σ2T 2
(T − s)2
VsT ds
]
. (4.4)
Proof of (4.3). Let us begin by deriving the dynamical equation satisfied by
the Shannon-Wiener entropy. From (2.3) and (2.5) we find that the conditional
probability satisfies
dπit =
σT
T − t
(xi − Xˆt)πitdWt. (4.5)
It follows, by an application of Ito’s lemma to (4.1), that
Ht = H0 −
1
2
∫ t
0
σ2T 2
(T − s)2
Vstds−
∫ t
0
σT
T − s
(
n∑
i=1
(xi − Xˆs)πis lnπis
)
dWs. (4.6)
Taking the expectation of both sides of (4.6), we obtain (4.3), as desired. 
Proof of (4.4). In Gel’fand & Yaglom (1957) it is shown that the mutual infor-
mation can be expressed as the expectation of the log density of the joint measure
µ
ξX
with respect to the product measure µ
ξ
∗µ
X
:
J(ξt, XT ) = E
[
ln
dµ
ξX
d(µ
ξ
∗µ
X
)
]
. (4.7)
We are thus required to determine the relevant Radon-Nikodym derivative. We shall
follow the line of argument presented in Davis (1978) (see, also, Duncan 1970). To
proceed, we require the introduction of an auxiliary measure B introduced in Mac-
rina (2006) and Brody et al. (2007, 2008a). This is the so-called bridge measure un-
der which the information process {ξt} becomes a Brownian bridge. The argument
goes as follows. We fix the probability space (Ω,F ,Q) with a filtration {Ht}0≤t<∞,
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and introduce a Q-Brownian motion {Bt} such that the Brownian bridge {βtT}
appearing in (2.1) is given by
βtT = (T − t)
∫ t
0
1
T − s
dBs. (4.8)
This is the standard integral representation for a Brownian bridge (see, e.g., Hida
1980, Protter 2005). Setting νt = σT/(T − t) we define
Λ−1t = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
νsXTdBs −
1
2
∫ t
0
ν2sX
2
T ds
)
, (4.9)
where XT is Q-independent of {Bt} and is H0-measurable. For fixed u < T we
introduce the measure B on Hu by writing
dB = Λ−1u dQ. (4.10)
Then the process {W ∗t }0≤t≤u defined by
W ∗t =
∫ t
0
νsXTds+Bt (4.11)
is a B-Brownian motion, since νsXT is bounded for any s ≤ u.
Under B we find that the distribution of XT is same as it is under Q, that {ξt}
and XT are independent, and that {ξt} is a B-Brownian bridge (cf. Brody et al.
2008a). To see these, recall that since XT and {βtT }, and hence XT and {Bt},
are independent, the probability law of {Bt} conditional on XT remains that of a
Brownian motion. Now take a bounded function f(x) and consider
EB [f(XT )] = E
[
f(XT )E[Λ
−1
u |XT ]
]
. (4.12)
Conditional on XT , Λ
−1
u takes the form of a Girsanov exponential, since {Bt} is a
Q-Brownian motion. Therefore, the inner expectation equals unity, and we find
EB [f(XT )] = E [f(XT )] (4.13)
for every bounded function f(x). In other words, XT has the same probability law
under Q and B. In a similar manner, for any sequence of times t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, u]
and any bounded function g : Rn → R we wish to calculate
EB [f(XT )g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)] = E
[
f(XT )E
[
g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)Λ
−1
u |XT
] ]
. (4.14)
By the same argument as above, for each XT the process {W
∗
t |XT }0≤t≤u is Brown-
ian under the measure whose density is Λ−1u |XT . Since {W
∗
t }0≤t≤u itself is Brownian
under B we have
E
[
g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)Λ
−1
u |XT
]
= EB [g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)] , (4.15)
and hence
EB [f(XT )g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)] = E [f(XT )]E
B [g(ξt1 , · · · , ξtn)] . (4.16)
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However, B and Q coincide on XT so that E
B[f(XT )] = E[f(XT )], from which it
follows that XT and {ξt} are B-independent. By combining (4.8) and (4.11) we get
dW ∗t = νtXTdt+
1
T − t
βtTdt+ dβtT . (4.17)
Eliminating βtT by use of βtT = ξt − σtXT we obtain the relation
dξt = −
1
T − t
ξtdt+ dW
∗
t , (4.18)
which is the dynamical equation satisfied by a Brownian bridge in the B measure.
Let Ψ be the map: ω → {{ξt(ω)}0≤t≤u, XT (ω)}. Then the joint sample space
measure of {{ξt(ω)}, XT (ω)} is µξX (A) = Q(Ψ
−1(A)) for any measurable set A, and
the sample space measure of XT is µX (A
′) = Q(X−1T (A
′)) for any measurable set
A′. However, since {ξt} and XT are independent under B, and {ξt} is a B-Brownian
bridge, we have µ
X
∗µ
β
(A) = B(Ψ−1(A)). It follows from (4.9) that
dQ
dB
= exp
(∫ u
0
νsXTdBs +
1
2
∫ u
0
ν2sX
2
Tds
)
. (4.19)
Substituting (4.11) in here we thus deduce that
dµ
ξX
d(µ
X
∗µ
β
)
= exp
(∫ u
0
νsXTdW
∗
s −
1
2
∫ u
0
ν2sX
2
Tds
)
. (4.20)
Turning to the innovations representation (2.5) we find, along with (4.18), that
{Wt} and {W
∗
t } are related according to
dW ∗t = νtXˆtdt+ dWt. (4.21)
Thus, following a similar line of argument we obtain
dµ
ξ
dµ
β
= exp
(∫ u
0
νsXˆsdW
∗
s −
1
2
∫ u
0
ν2s Xˆ
2
sds
)
, (4.22)
which is a version of the likelihood ratio formula of Kailath (1971). The measure
µ
ξ
thus corresponds to the ‘signal present’ situation, while the ‘signal absent’ case
corresponds to {ξt} being pure bridge noise with measure µβ . Combining (4.20)
and (4.22), and making use of (4.11), we deduce
dµ
ξX
d(µ
ξ
∗µ
X
)
= exp
(∫ u
0
νs(XT − Xˆs)dBs +
1
2
∫ u
0
ν2s (XT − Xˆs)
2ds
)
. (4.23)
Taking the expectation of the logarithm of this, bearing in mind that {Bt} is a
Q-Brownian motion, we recover (4.4), as claimed. 
The entropy process {Ht}0≤t<T has the property that limt→T Ht = 0. This
follows from the fact that the conditional probability process {πit}0≤t<T has the
limiting behaviour
lim
t→T
πit(ω) = 1{XT (ω) = xi} (4.24)
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for i = 1, . . . , n. The proof of (4.24) is as follows. Let ω ∈ Ω be fixed, and suppose
that XT (ω) = xk for some k. For this realisation of ω the information process is
given by ξt = σtxk+βtT . Substituting this expression for ξt into (2.3) and dividing
the denominator and the numerator by the exponential factor appearing in the
numerator, we deduce that
πkt =
pk
pk +
∑
j 6=k
pj exp
[
T
T−t
(
σ(xj − xk)βtT −
1
2σ
2t(xj − xk)2
)] . (4.25)
Observe that all of the terms in the sum in the denominator vanish as t approaches
T , and therefore limt→T πkt = 1. It follows that limt→T πit = 0 for i 6= k, and thus
(4.24). Finally, since Ht = − ln
∏n
i=1 π
πit
it by (4.1) and since limt→T π
πit
it = 1, we
deduce that limt→T Ht = 0.
If we let t approach T in (4.3) we find the following relation:
H0 =
1
2E
[∫ T
0
σ2T 2
(T − s)2
VsT ds
]
. (4.26)
Since H0 is bounded by lnn, where n is the number of values XT can take, and
since the coefficient of the conditional variance {VsT } in the integrand diverges
quadratically as s approaches T , this relation shows that the variance process has
to decay sufficiently rapidly to ensure the existence of the right side of (4.26). On
the other hand, the conditional variance also generates the random movement of
the asset price volatility in (2.4). As a consequence we are able to obtain a crude
estimate of the magnitude of the cumulative volatility. It is worth noting that in
models based on Brownian noise the entropy and mutual information are closely
related to prices of variance or volatility derivatives. A related observation has been
made by Soklakov (2008).
It should be remarked that the limiting behaviour limt→T Ht = 0 is specific to
the case in which XT takes discrete values. If XT is a continuous random variable,
then the associated entropy has the property that limt→T Ht = −∞, which can be
seen from the Hirschman inequality in Fourier analysis (Beckner 1975):
Ht ≤
1
2 (1 + ln(2π)) +
1
2 lnVtT . (4.27)
It follows from (4.6) that the variance process {VsT } in this case does not vanish
sufficiently rapidly to ensure finiteness of the right side of (4.3) as t approaches T .
In other words, there is a qualitative difference in the behaviour of the volatility
process, depending on whether the cash flow is a continuous or discrete random
variable. In particular, volatility products may be overpriced in models based on
continuous cash flows, since real market cash flows are not continuous.
5. A model for an informed trader
In the previous sections we have examined the BHM framework from an information
theoretic perspective. In particular, we have been able to quantify the amount of
information about the future cash flow of an asset contained in its price. We turn
now to consider a model for an informed trader who has access to an additional
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information source, apart from the price process itself, concerning the future return
of an asset. We assume that the informed trader is ‘small’ in the sense that access to
the additional information is limited, and that the actions of the informed trader will
not impact the price process. In other words, the model is not for a large number of
small agents; rather, it is for a single agent, or a highly restricted number of agents,
who carefully execute their trading strategies, taking advantage of the additional
information.
One might expect that the use of additional information gives a definite advan-
tage for the trader. This, however, is not necessarily the case: additional information
is in general obscured by additional noise. As a consequence, the valuation process
estimated by the informed trader can entail higher volatility than the actual market
price movements. It follows that any strategy making use of additional information
will tend to embody additional risk. Nevertheless, on average such strategies are ex-
pected to outperform the market, and this is the idea behind some of the statistical
arbitrage strategies adopted by hedge funds.
The BHM framework is sufficiently flexible to model this kind of scenario. In-
deed, the use of this framework as a basis for the development of insider-trading
models was recognised early on (Macrina 2006). Our intention here is to apply
such ideas to describe the disparity in the ability of processing publicly available
information, and to illustrate how statistical arbitrage opportunities can be seen
to arise in a simple model. It should be emphasised that many of the simplifying
assumptions—that the asset entails a single cash flow; that the information flow
rates are constants; that the interest rate is deterministic; and that the noises are
modelled by Brownian bridges—can be relaxed without affecting the main qualita-
tive features of the model.
We assume the setup for the market outlined in §2. However, in addition there
is an informed trader who has a further noisy information source represented by
the information process
ξ′t = σ
′tXT + β
′
tT . (5.1)
The noise term {β′tT } may or may not be correlated with the market noise {βtT }.
We let {Bt} and {B
′
t} be a pair of Brownian motions with correlation ρ, and define
the associated Brownian bridges by
βtT = Bt −
t
T
BT , and β
′
tT = B
′
t −
t
T
B′T . (5.2)
In this way we can model the two noise terms with fair amount of generality (we
may use alternatively the integral representation (4.8) to construct the bridge pro-
cesses; however, the choice (5.2) is more suitable for simulation purposes), since ρ
determines the correlation of {βtT } and {β
′
tT }. In particular, if |ρ| = 1 then the
informed trader has two linear equations (2.1) and (5.1) for the two unknowns
XT and βtT ; hence the value of the future cash flow XT will become instantly
accessible to the trader (assuming |σ| 6= |σ′|). This situation corresponds to the
fully-informed conventional ‘insider’ often considered in the literature. The other
extreme, for which |ρ| ≪ 1, is of interest, since the informed trader must choose a
strategy optimally so as not to be overwhelmed by the additional noise.
We let {F ′t} denote the filtration generated by {ξ
′
t}. If σ
′ > σ, then knowledge of
the value of XT is revealed at a faster rate in the ‘primed’ filtration. This, however,
Working paper.
12 Brody, Davis, Friedman & Hughston
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (yrs)
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
P
r
i
c
e
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (yrs)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
P
r
i
c
e
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (yrs)
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
P
r
i
c
e
0 0.5 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
time (yrs)
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
P
r
i
c
e
Figure 2. Sample paths comparison for a defaultable digital bond. Each plot contains a
pair of sample paths: one for which the bond does not default and one for which the
bond defaults. The two plots on the left show the market prices with σ = 0.25 (top) and
σ = 0.7 (bottom). Market prices can be compared with the valuations estimated by the
informed trader, represented by the two plots on the right. The parameters are chosen
to be σ′ = 0.4, ρ = 0.1 (top) and σ′ = 0.01, ρ = 0.9 (bottom). In all plots, the other
parameters are set to be h1 = 0, h2 = 1, p0 = 0.2, p1 = 0.8, r = 0.05, and T = 1.
does not mean that {Ft} is contained in {F
′
t} even if ρ = 1; the two filtrations are
merely inequivalent. On the other hand, since the informed trader also has access
to the price process, which is adapted to {Ft}, it is reasonable to assume that
the information source is given by {Gt} = σ({ξs, ξ
′
s}0≤s≤t). We assume that the
additional information commences at time t = 0; hence the a priori probabilities
{pi} for XT to take the values {xi} remain the same. This assumption may seem
limiting; however, it is not unreasonable since the ‘lifetime’ of the extra information,
i.e. the period over which extra information has value, is often short in practice.
The informed trader will use the extra information to work out the price that the
market would have made had {Gt} been accessible to general market participants.
We shall now calculate the valuation process made by the informed trader on this
basis. From the Markov property of the joint information process {ξt, ξ
′
t} we find
that the informed valuation process is given by
B˜tT = PtT
n∑
i=1
xiπ˜it, (5.3)
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Figure 3. Comparison between averaged market prices and informed valuations. In both
plots, the solid lines represent averaged market prices of a defaultable digital bond; one
which default does not occur and one which the bond defaulted. The parameters are chosen
so that XT takes values 0 or 1 with a priori default probability 20%, r = 5%, T = 1, and
the market signal-to-noise ratio is σ = 0.2. These are compared with the corresponding
averages for the informed trader (dashed lines), with two sets of parameters: σ′ = 0.4 and
ρ = 0.1 (left); and σ′ = 0 and ρ = 0.95 (right).
where π˜it = Q(XT = xi|ξt, ξ
′
t). By use of the Bayes formula
π˜it =
piρ(ξt, ξ
′
t|XT = xi)∑n
i=0 piρ(ξt, ξ
′
t|XT = xi)
, (5.4)
where the conditional density is given by the bivariate normal density function
ρ(ξt, ξ
′
t|XT = xi) =
T
2πt(T − t)
√
1− ρ2
exp
[
−
T
2(1− ρ2)
×
(
(ξt − σxit)
2
t(T − t)
−
2ρ(ξt − σxit)(ξ
′
t − σ
′xit)
t(T − t)
+
(ξ′t − σ
′xit)
2
t(T − t)
)]
, (5.5)
we deduce that
B˜tT = PtT
∑n
i=1 pixi exp
[
T
̺(T−t)
(
xi(σ1ξt + σ2ξ
′
t)−
1
2σ
2
3x
2
i t
)]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
̺(T−t)
(
xi(σ1ξt + σ2ξ′t)−
1
2σ
2
3x
2
i t
)] . (5.6)
Here we set σ1 = σ − ρσ
′, σ2 = σ
′ − ρσ, σ23 = σ
2 − 2ρσσ′ + σ′2, and ̺ = 1− ρ2.
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The process (5.6) is our model for the valuations made by the informed trader. It
is straightforward to simulate the informed valuation process {B˜tT } and compare
this against the uninformed market price process {BtT }. By suitably adjusting
the values for σ, σ′, and ρ we are able to confirm various intuitive aspects of
the behaviour of these processes; some examples are displayed in Figure 2. With
respect to any given sample path the expected price of the informed trader at time
t ∈ [0, T ] may be less accurate (by ‘accurate’ we mean close to the true value) than
the market price. However, on average the valuation determined by the informed
trader converges more rapidly to the true value of the bond. This is illustrated in
Figure 3 where we plot the averaged sample paths conditional on the given outcome.
The plot on the right side of Figure 3 indicates that the performance of the
informed trader is high even if the signal-to-noise ratio σ′ of the additional infor-
mation source is set to zero (and hence {ξ′t} is pure noise). In fact the quality of
the estimate decreases as the value of σ′ is raised from zero, until it reaches the
critical level σ′ = ρσ. Putting the matter differently, the quality of the estimate
made by an informed trader is not monotonic in the signal-to-noise ratio of the
additional information source. This feature may appear counterintuitive, but it can
be understood by rearrangement of terms in (5.6) into a form analogous to (4.5):
B˜tT = PtT
pkxk +
∑
i6=k
pixi exp
[
T
̺(T−t)
(
(1− ρ)(σ + σ′)ωikβtT −
1
2σ
2
3ω
2
ikt
)]
pk +
∑
i6=k
pi exp
[
T
̺(T−t)
(
(1 − ρ)(σ + σ′)ωikβtT −
1
2σ
2
3ω
2
ikt
)] . (5.7)
Here we write ωik = xi − xk. This expression shows that the exponential rate
of convergence for the process {B˜tT } to approach the ‘true’ value xk is governed
by the ratio σ23tT/[2̺(T − t)]. In particular, for fixed σ and ρ this ratio takes a
minimum value at σ′ = ρσ. When σ′ = ρσ, the linear equations ξt = σtXT + βtT
and ξ′t = σ
′tXT + β
′
tT become closest to being degenerate, and hence the value of
the additional information is minimised.
6. Innovations and the dynamics of informed valuations
Our objective now is to obtain an innovations representation for the valuations
made by the informed trader. For this purpose it suffices to derive the dynamical
equation satisfied by the ‘insider’ valuation {B˜tT }, or equivalently, by the condi-
tional probability {π˜it}. The calculation simplifies if we express (5.6) in the form
B˜tT = PtT
∑n
i=1 pixi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σˆxiξˆt −
1
2 σˆ
2x2i t
)]
∑n
i=1 pi exp
[
T
T−t
(
σˆxiξˆt −
1
2 σˆ
2x2i t
)] . (6.1)
Here the process
ξˆt = σˆtXT + βˆtT , σˆ
2 =
σ2 − 2ρσσ′ + σ′2
1− ρ2
(6.2)
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represents the ‘enhanced’ information being effectively received by the informed
trader, with the modified bridge noise
βˆtT =
√
1− ρ2
σ2 − 2ρσσ′ + σ′2
[
σ − ρσ′
1− ρ2
βtT +
σ′ − ρσ
1− ρ2
β′tT
]
. (6.3)
Applying Ito’s lemma to (5.4) and making use of (6.2), we find that
dπ˜it
π˜it
=
σˆT
T − t
(xi − X˜t) dZt, (6.4)
where X˜t = E[XT |Gt]. The process {Zt} appearing in (6.4) is defined by
Zt = ξˆt +
∫ t
0
1
T − s
ξˆsds−
∫ t
0
σˆT
T − s
X˜sds. (6.5)
By following a line of argument similar to that presented in Brody et al. (2007)
it can be shown that {Zt} is a standard Gt-Brownian motion. It follows that the
valuation process of the informed trader obeys the following dynamical equation:
dB˜tT = rtB˜tTdt+ ΓtdZt, (6.6)
where the volatility process {Γt} is given by
Γt =
σˆT
T − t
PtT V˜tT , (6.7)
and V˜tT denotes the variance of XT conditional on Gt.
The fact that the information {ξt, ξ
′
t} accessible to the informed trader can be
‘compactified’ into a single enhanced information {ξˆt} can be understood as follows.
Since the noise processes {βtT } and {β
′
tT } have correlation ρ, one can write
β′tT = ρβtT +
√
1− ρ2 β¯tT , (6.8)
where the Brownian bridge process {β¯tT } is taken to be independent of {βtT }.
Similarly, we can decompose the extra information {ξ′t} in the form
ξ′t = ρξt +
√
1− ρ2 ξ¯t, (6.9)
where ξ¯t = σ¯tXT + β¯tT and σ¯ = (σ
′ − ρσ)/
√
1− ρ2. It should be evident that
the filtration generated jointly by {ξt, ξ
′
t} is equivalent to that generated jointly by
{ξt, ξ¯t}. However, the information processes {ξt} and {ξ¯t} have independent noises.
To proceed we note that the process {δt} defined by
δt =
ξt
σ
−
ξ¯t
σ¯
=
βtT
σ
−
β¯tT
σ¯
(6.10)
is purely noise, and is independent of XT . We can construct a new Brownian bridge
that is independent of this noise. A standard orthogonalisation shows that this is
given by the bridge process {βˆtT } defined by (6.3). It follows that the enhanced
information process {ξˆt} defined by (6.2) is independent of {δt}. Furthermore, the
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filtration generated jointly by {ξt, ξ
′
t} is equivalent to that generated jointly by
{ξˆt, δt}. Since {δt} provides no useful information about XT , i.e. J(δt, XT ) = 0, the
informed trader in effect has {ξˆt} as the primary basis for valuation.
This line of argument, making use of the orthogonalisation procedure, extends
more generally to the case where there are multiple information processes relating
to the cash flow XT : Starting with a family of processes {ξ
k
t }k=1,...,n with signal-to-
noise ratios {σk}k=1,...,n one orthogonalises the associated noises. The result is a new
set of information processes {ξ¯kt }k=1,...,n with signal-to-noise ratios {σ¯k}k=1,...,n.
Then the information process that the informed trader uses as a basis for valuation
can be represented by a single effective information process {ξˆt} with the enhanced
signal-to-noise ratio σˆ = (
∑
k σ¯
2
k)
1/2.
7. Additional information held by the informed trader and
statistical arbitrage strategies exploiting this
We are in a position to quantify the amount of excess information held by the
informed trader above that of the market. This is measured by the difference of the
mutual information:
∆J = J(ξˆt, XT )− J(ξt, XT ). (7.1)
By the argument in §3, the mutual information of the informed trader is given by
an entropy difference of the form
J(ξˆt, XT ) = H(ξˆt)−H(ξˆt|XT ). (7.2)
The entropyH(ξˆt) of the ‘insider’ information is determined by the marginal density
of ξˆt, whereas the conditional entropyH(ξˆt|XT ) is the entropy of a Brownian bridge.
Following the line of argument presented in §4 we are able to represent the
mutual information difference in terms of the expected entropy differences:
∆J = E[Ht]− E[H˜t], (7.3)
where H˜t = −
∑
i π˜it ln π˜it. This expression makes it apparent that ∆J is nonnega-
tive, since the entropy characterises the amount of uncertainty concerning the value
of the cash flow XT , and for any t ∈ (0, T ) this uncertainty is greater on average
for the general market participant than for the informed trader. In Figure 4 we plot
an example of ∆J , indicating the way in which the excess information held by the
informed trader changes in time.
Given that the informed trader is on average ‘more knowledgable’ than the gen-
eral market participant it is natural to ask how this advantage can be turned into
profit. One of the issues that can be addressed in this connection is the derivation
of optimal trading strategies. For such an analysis one may need to introduce addi-
tional structure into the problem in the form of a suitable criterion for optimality
and a specification of the market price of risk. In the present investigation, we con-
fine the discussion to a demonstration, supported by simulation studies, of how even
very simple strategies can yield statistical arbitrage opportunities by outperforming
the market.
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Figure 4. Mutual information difference. The additional information held by the informed
trader over that of the market is nonnegative. The parameters are set to be h1 = 0, h2 = 1,
p1 = 0.2, p2 = 0.8, T = 1, σ = 0.25, σ
′ = 0.45, and ρ = 0.15.
For example, suppose we consider a strategy such that at some designated time
t ∈ [0, T ] a market trader purchases a digital bond iff at that time the bond price
BtT is greater than KPtT for some specified threshold K. The value of K can be
regarded as the risk aversion level of the trader. An informed trader follows the same
rule, but makes a better estimate for the value of the bond, and hence purchases
the bond iff B˜tT > KPtT . In either case a bond that is purchased will be held until
maturity. That such a strategy leads to a statistical arbitrage opportunity for the
informed trader can be seen as follows. We assume that the initial position of the
trader is zero, i.e. purchase of a digital bond at t requires borrowing the amount
BtT at that time, and repaying the amount P
−1
tT BtT at T . Thus the value of the
market trader’s portfolio at T is
VT = 1{BtT > KPtT }(XT − P
−1
tT BtT ), (7.4)
whereas the terminal value of the informed trader’s portfolio is
V˜T = 1{B˜tT > KPtT }(XT − P
−1
tT BtT ). (7.5)
Consider now the present value P0TE[∆VT ] of a security that delivers a cash flow
equal to the excess P&L ∆VT = V˜T −VT generated by the strategy of the informed
trader. By use of the tower property we have E[∆VT ] = E[E[∆VT |Gt]]; but
E[∆VT |Gt] = P
−1
tT
(
1{B˜tT > KPtT } − 1{BtT > KPtT }
)(
B˜tT −BtT
)
, (7.6)
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Figure 5. The P&L difference for digital bonds. At each time the traders purchase the
bond if and only if the valuation of the bond is greater than a specified threshold. The
general market trader buys if BtT > KPtT , whereas the informed trader uses the condition
B˜tT > KPtT . The difference in profit and loss between the informed trader and the general
market trader is plotted, based on 2000 realisations, when the a priori probability of
default is p1 = 0.2. Other parameters are set to be h1 = 0, h2 = 1, T = 5, σ = 0.25,
σ′ = 0.45, ρ = 0.15, and K = 0.7.
since the random variables BtT and B˜tT are both Gt-measurable. If B˜tT > BtT
then 1{B˜tT > KPtT } − 1{BtT > KPtT } is nonnegative, whereas if B˜tT < BtT
then 1{B˜tT > KPtT } − 1{BtT > KPtT } is nonpositive. It follows that E[∆VT |Gt]
is a nonnegative random variable, and hence E[∆VT ] > 0, since E[∆VT |Gt] > 0
with probability greater than zero. Therefore, the informed trader can execute a
transaction at zero cost that has positive value, and this is what we mean by
‘statistical arbitrage’.
We have examined the profit and loss (P&L) profile, both for a general market
trader and for an informed trader, resulting from the repeated application of such
a strategy. The results are plotted in Figure 5. In particular, we consider 2000
realisations (sample paths) for the information processes governing the bond price
valuations. For each fixed t ∈ [0, T ] we calculate the total P&L for the informed
trader and for the market trader obtained by following the specified strategy over
and over for each of the 2000 independent sample paths. For each fixed t, we chart
in Figure 5 the difference between the total P&L of the informed trader and that
of the market trader. Providing that the strategy is executed after enough time
has passed for the informed trader to gain an informational advantage, we find
that the difference between the P&L of the informed trader and that of the market
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trader is always positive. Furthermore, the qualitative behaviour of the resulting
P&L difference is in agreement with the qualitative behaviour of the magnitude
of the excess information possessed by the informed trader indicated in Figure 4
(we have chosen the same parameter values for these two figures to allow for direct
comparison).
Our objective has been to demonstrate how statistical arbitrage strategies arise
in a market characterised by heterogeneous information flow. It is interesting that
a qualitatively similar behaviour for the excess information and the excess P&L
is observed in the case of the rather primitive strategy we have considered here.
There are many ways in which one can improve upon the trading strategy examined
above. An important open issue is to determine the optimal trading strategy, subject
to suitable optimality criteria, that exploits the excess information. We conclude
by remarking that a related approach to the modelling of insider trading within
the information-based framework is suggested in Macrina (2006), where the asset
return is modelled as being dependent on more than one market factor, for which
only some of the associated information processes are accessible to the market. It
would be of interest to examine whether the kind of hedge fund strategy considered
here is also applicable in a setup involving multiple market factors.
We thank J. Z. Kelly, A. Macrina, B. K. Meister, and M. F. Parry for stimulating discus-
sions.
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